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Key Points 
This Policy Brief argues that the newly adopted EU temporary relocation (quota) system constitutes a 
welcome yet timid step forward in addressing a number of central controversies of the current refugee 
debate in Europe. Two main challenges affect the effective operability of the new EU relocation model.  
First, EU member states’ asylum systems show profound (on-the-ground) weaknesses in reception 
conditions and judicial/administrative capacities. These prevent a fair and humane processing of asylum 
applications. EU states are not implementing the common standards enshrined in the EU reception 
conditions Directive 2013/33. 
Second, the new relocation system constitutes a move away from the much-criticised Dublin system, but 
it is still anchored to its premises. The Dublin system is driven by an unfair and unsustainable rule 
according to which the first EU state of entry is responsible for assessing asylum applications. It does not 
properly consider the personal, private and family circumstances or the preferences of asylum-seekers. 
Policy Recommendations 
In order to respond to these challenges, the Policy Brief offers the following policy recommendations: 
1. The EU should strengthen and better enforce member states’ reception capacities, abolish the 
current Dublin system rule of allocation of responsibility and expand the new relocation 
distribution criteria to include in the assessment (as far as possible) asylum-seekers’ preferences and 
personal/family links to EU member states. 
2. EU member countries should give priority to boosting their current and forward-looking 
administrative and judicial capacities to deal and welcome asylum applications. 
3. The EU should establish a permanent common European border and asylum service focused on 
ensuring the highest standards through stable operational support, institutional solidarity across 
all EU external borders and the practical implementation of new distribution relocation criteria. 
 
2 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
1. Introduction 
On September 22nd, an Extraordinary Justice and 
Home Affairs Council Meeting adopted a 
controversial new Decision establishing 
provisional measures for the relocation of 120,000 
asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece to other 
EU member states.1 This was based on a previous 
proposal by the European Commission advanced 
on the occasion of President Juncker’s State of the 
Union speech before the European Parliament on 
9 September 2015.2 The Commission has 
welcomed the adoption of the Decision by the 
Council3 and adopted on 23 September 2015 a 
Communication on Managing the Refugee 
Crisis4 laying down the priority actions for the 
months. 
This Policy Brief examines the scope and 
components of the newly adopted EU 
Temporary Relocation System. It studies the 
material and personal scope of the system and 
addresses how it is expected to work in practice, 
how much it will cost and who will be covered 
by its relocation model. The Policy Brief pays 
particular attention to the main issues and 
challenges that confront the effective operability 
of the EU relocation regime.  
It is argued that the EU provisional relocation 
system, and its potential future conversion into a 
permanent system, constitutes a timid step 
forward in addressing the central controversies 
of the current refugee debate in Europe, which 
revolve around the question whether all member 
states are doing enough to receive and assist 
refugees arriving in the EU. That question aside, 
two other main challenges also affect the 
                                                   
1 Council Decision establishing provisional measures in 
the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy 
and Greece, Council of the EU, 12098/15, 22 September 
2015. 
2 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece 
and Hungary, COM(2015) 451 final, 9.9.2015. 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5596_en.htm). 
3 See the European Commission’s Statement 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm). 
workability and suitability of the proposed 
relocation system.  
First, EU member states are not fully complying 
with their obligations to provide acceptable and 
comprehensive reception conditions for asylum-
seekers and refugees, as required by the EU 
reception conditions Directive 2013/33.5 The 
current shortcomings in the EU’s reception 
conditions ultimately undermine any proposed 
variation of the Dublin asylum system just as it 
undermined the Dublin system itself, and 
constitutes a serious practical impediment for the 
temporary relocation model to work.  
Second, some of the aspects introduced by the 
temporary and permanent EU relocation 
schemes are to be welcomed, such as the need for 
member state authorities to take into account the 
potential of the applicants to fit into daily life of 
the relocation state. For example, their language 
skills and family, cultural or social ties will have 
to be taken into account when making the 
decision. However, a key weakness of this 
relocation model is that it is still anchored in the 
much-criticised Dublin system. By doing so, it 
primarily addresses the symptoms and not the 
actual causes behind the ‘crisis’: an unfair system 
of attribution of state responsibility for 
determining asylum applications, which often 
results in human rights and protection failures; 
and a system that gives little consideration to the 
preferences of asylum-seekers when assessing 
their family, private and economic links to a 
certain state of relocation.6  
This Policy Brief makes policy recommendations 
aimed at ensuring that any temporary and/or 
4 Commission Communication, “Managing the refugee 
crisis: Immediate operational, budgetary and legal 
measures under the European Agenda on Migration”, 
COM(2015)490 final, 23.9.2015. 
5 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for 
the reception of applicants for international protection, 
OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96–116. 
6 S. Carrera and K. Lannoo (2015), “Treat the Root 
Causes of the Asylum Crisis, not the Symptoms”, CEPS 
Commentary, CEPS, Brussels. 
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permanent relocation system for refugees in the 
EU works effectively. It suggests that the EU 
should give priority to better strengthening and 
enforcing member states’ reception capacities, 
abolishing the current Dublin rule of allocating 
responsibility and expanding the relocation 
distribution criteria to include in the assessment 
consideration of asylum-seekers’ personal 
preferences and links to certain EU member 
states. It is recommended that the EU should 
establish a permanent border and asylum service 
focused on building sustainable and the highest 
standards through stable operational support, 
institutional solidarity across the Union’s 
external borders and the practical 
implementation of new distribution relocation 
criteria. 
2. The EU’s temporary relocation 
system: What are the key features? 
The Council Decision introduces a temporary 
relocation system in the EU. It consists of the 
transfer of applicants for international protection 
from two EU member states (Greece and Italy) to 
the territory of other EU member states of 
relocation. The Decision constitutes a provisional 
emergency-led scheme envisaged to run for a 
period of two years. It is legally founded on 
Article 78.3 TFEU.7 What are the most important 
features of the new system? 
2.1 The system and its scope 
There have been many discussions over whether 
the system should be mandatory or not for EU 
member states. While it has been said that the 
system does not oblige EU member states to 
                                                   
7This provision states: “In the event that one or more 
Member States being confronted by an emergency 
situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of 
third countries”. It aims at “supporting them in better 
coping with an emergency situation characterised by a 
sudden inflow of nationals of third countries in those 
Member States” (Article 1.1). 
8 Article 5.2 of the Decision states: “Member States shall, 
at regular intervals, and at least every three months, 
indicate the number of applicants who can be relocated 
swiftly to their territory and any other relevant 
information.” 
participate, the Decision does lay down specific 
rules limiting their options not to participate in 
the new relocation model.8 The Decision 
expressly foresees in Article 4.5: 
A Member State may, in exceptional 
circumstances notify the Council and the 
Commission that it is temporarily unable to take 
part in the relocation process of up to 30% of 
applicants allocated to it in accordance with 
paragraph 1, giving duly justified reasons 
compatible with the fundamental values of the 
Union enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
Therefore one may conclude that it is de facto a 
binding system for participating EU member 
states. This is so even if the Council has finally 
lifted the possibility for the Commission to apply 
financial responsibility in cases of non-
participation.9 The adopted version differs from 
the original Commission proposal, which had 
foreseen the application of a financial penalty or 
contribution to the EU budget (of 0.002% of GDP) 
in the event of non-participation by EU member 
states in cases where the Commission would 
have found that the non-participation was 
temporarily justified.10 
The geographical scope of the Decision only 
covers Italy and Greece. Surprisingly it leaves out 
Hungary, which was part of the original 
Commission proposal of September 9th. The 
Hungarian government has repeatedly 
expressed opposition to any EU relocation 
system.11 Hungary was reportedly among the EU 
member state governments voting against the 
adoption of the Decision inside the Council (in 
addition to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
9The UK, Ireland and Denmark do not participate in this 
Decision. 
10 The Commission proposal stated: “… and shall instead 
make a financial contribution to the EU budget of an 
amount of 0,002 % of GDP; in case of partial participation 
in the relocation, this amount shall be reduced in 
proportion. This contribution shall be used to finance 
assistance supporting the efforts undertaken by all other 
Member States to cope with the crisis situation and the 
consequences of the non-participation of such Member 
State.” 
11 See https://euobserver.com/migration/130105. 
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Romania, with Finland abstaining).12 The 
Decision however leaves the option open for 
other EU member states to be included in a later 
stage. Likewise, a member state may, giving duly 
justified reasons, notify the Council and the 
Commission that it is confronted with a similar 
emergency situation and fall within the scope of 
the system. 
The Commission has planned to move from this 
provisional relocation arrangement to a 
permanent one with a proposal for a Regulation, 
which would establish a “permanent crisis 
relocation mechanism under the Dublin 
system”.13 This system would introduce a 
permanent framework for the implementation of 
temporary relocation measures and require a 
formal amendment of the Dublin Regulation 
(EU) No 604/2013.14 The legal basis for this 
additional proposal is Article 78.2.e TFEU, which 
envisages the application of the ordinary 
legislative procedure, and hence brings in the 
European Parliament as co-legislator. 
The permanent mechanism would be triggered 
by the Commission on the basis of information 
provided by the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) and Frontex (the EU’s External 
Borders Agency) in situations where a member 
state would be confronted with “a crisis situation 
jeopardising the application of [the Dublin 
                                                   
12 See www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/eu-
backs-refugee-plan-teeth-east-european-opposition-
317859). 
13 Proposal for a Regulation establishing a crisis 
relocation mechanism and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third country national or a stateless person, 
COM(2015) 450 final, 9.9.2015, Brussels. As the proposal 
states, “these measures will be applied in respect of 
specific crisis situations in a given Member State and 
will, by definition, remain temporary.” 
14 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of 
System] due to extreme pressure characterised by 
a large and disproportionate inflow of third-
country nationals or stateless persons, which 
places significant demands on its asylum 
system.”15 
2.2 Moving beyond the Dublin 
system?  
The temporary relocation system does not move 
far beyond the current EU Dublin system of rules 
on the distribution of responsibility. It is still 
intended to work under its premises and guiding 
principles. It constitutes a ‘temporary 
derogation’ of the Dublin principle laid out in 
Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013,16 
according to which the first state of entry is 
usually the one responsible for the examination 
of the asylum claim and those persons must stay 
in that member state. 
The system brings in new criteria or ‘distribution 
keys’ for determining legal responsibility among 
EU member states. According the Commission 
proposal COM(2015) 451 of 9 September, the 
relocation would be done on the basis of “a 
mandatory distribution key using objective and 
quantifiable criteria (40% of the size of the 
population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average 
number of past asylum applications, 10% of the 
unemployment rate)”.17 The exact distribution 
the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 31–59. 
15 The following indicators would be taken into account 
by the European Commission: “The total number of 
applicants for international protection and of irregular 
entries of third country nationals and stateless persons in 
the six months preceding the adoption of the delegated 
act, the increase in such numbers compared to the same 
period in the previous year as well as the number of 
applications per capita in the Member State benefiting 
from relocation over the previous 18 months compared 
to the Union average.” 
16 Ibid. 
17 The Decision does not make express reference to these 
distribution criteria. It only states in Recital 25: “…a clear 
and workable system is envisaged based on a threshold 
of the average rate at Union level of decisions granting 
international protection in the procedures at first 
instance, as defined by Eurostat, out of the total number 
at Union level of decisions on applications for 
international protection taken at first instance, based on 
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criteria were laid down in the Annexes of the 
proposal,18 which are included in Annex 1 of this 
Policy Brief, and which can be summarised as 
follows: 
a) The size of the population (40% weighting), 
which reflects the capacity of a member 
state to welcome a certain number of 
refugees; 
b) Total GDP (40% weighting), which aims to 
reflect the absolute wealth of a country and 
is indicative of the capacity of an economy 
to integrate refugees;  
c) Average number of asylum applications 
per one million inhabitants over 2010-14 
(10% weighting, with a 30% cap of the 
population and GDP effect on the key); and  
d) Unemployment rate (10% weighting, with 
a 30% cap of the population and GDP effect 
on the key), which is aimed at showing the 
capacity to integrate refugees in the labour 
markets. 
The exact economic formula that is used by the 
Commission is provided in Annex 2 of this Policy 
Brief. Other criteria applied in determining the 
EU member state of relocation include the so-
called ‘integration potential’ of the applicants. 
The Council Decision establishes that specific 
attention shall be given to “the specific 
qualifications and characteristics of the 
applicants concerned, such as their language 
skills and other individual indications based on 
demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which 
could facilitate their integration into the Member 
State of relocation.” It is by no means clear how 
                                                   
the latest available statistics. On the one hand, this 
threshold would have to ensure, to the maximum extent 
possible, that all applicants in clear need of international 
protection would be in a position to fully and swiftly 
enjoy their protection rights in the Member State of 
relocation. On the other hand, it would have to prevent, 
to the maximum extent possible, applicants who are 
likely to receive a negative decision on their application 
from being relocated to another Member State, and 
therefore from prolonging unduly their stay in the 
Union. A threshold of 75%, based on the latest available 
updated Eurostat quarterly data for decisions at first 
instance, should be used in this Decision.” 
18 European Commission, Annexes accompanying the 
Proposal for a Council decision establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the 
criteria such as ‘cultural and social ties’ are to be 
understood and interpreted by national 
authorities. Moreover, the operability of the 
temporary relocation system will be based on 
careful consideration of the capacity of the state 
of relocation to provide adequate support to 
vulnerable applicants. 
2.3 Who and how many refugees will 
be covered?  
How many asylum-seekers are to be relocated in 
accordance to the proposed system? The Council 
Decision refers to a total of 120,000, which 
corresponds with the Commission’s proposal. 
This number needs to be added to the previously 
adopted Decision to relocate 40,000 asylum-
seekers from Greece and Italy in July 2015.19 
During the first year, the following number of 
applicants will be covered: 15,600 applicants are 
slated to be relocated from Italy to the territory of 
other member states; and 50,400 applicants will 
be relocated from Greece to the territory of other 
member states.  
The Decision foresees an additional volume of 
54,000 asylum-seekers to be relocated in a later 
stage from these two countries (Greece and Italy), 
with the starting date/period to be determined in 
a 2nd year phase. The Commission is expected to 
submit a proposal to the Council on the figures to 
be allocated accordingly per member state. This 
is an important variation from the original 
Commission proposal which had envisaged 
these 54,000 to be relocated from Hungary.20 
benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary, COM(2015) 451, 
Brussels, 9.9.2015. 
19 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5039_en.htm. Council Decision establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and of Greece, 11161/15, 3 September 
2015. See also Council of the EU, Resolution of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on relocating from 
Greece and Italy 40 000 persons in clear need of 
international protection, 11131/15, Brussels, 22 July 2015. 
20 The Decision leaves the Commission the option to 
consider the adaptation of the mechanism, and the 
potential sharing of the 54,000 volume, in light of “the 
evolution of the situation on the ground or that a 
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Yet, the personal scope will be limited. It would 
only cover applicants for international protection 
who have first lodged their applications in 
Greece or Italy, which would have been 
responsible for the assessment in light of the 
current Dublin system. Relocation will only 
cover those nationalities for which the 
proportion of positive decisions granting 
international protection has been 75% or more, 
according to the updated quarterly Union-wide 
average of Eurostat data. These include Syrians, 
Eritreans and Iraqis,21 and leaves out applicants 
such as those originating from the Western 
Balkans in a rather difficult position, while their 
situation in these countries appears to be far from 
‘safe’.22 
In light of the above, from a pure quantitative 
point of view, the temporary relocation system 
envisaged by the Council Decision will affect a 
relatively small number of refugees. This is 
particularly true in relation to those EU member 
states that have expressed the most concerns and 
did not agree with the Decision taken by the 
Council. Annex 1 shows that countries like 
Slovakia will receive a total of only 800 
applicants, and the Czech Republic around 1,600. 
It is therefore difficult to rationally conceive why 
the relocation system will impose an 
unreasonable and disproportionate ‘burden’ on 
these and other EU countries. 
                                                   
Member State is confronted with an emergency situation 
characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third 
countries due to a sharp shift of migration flows and 
taking into account the views of the likely beneficiary 
Member State”. 
21 According to Eurostat, during the second quarter of 
2015, “Syrians have received by far the highest number 
of protection statuses in the EU, including protection 
based on national legislations (24,400 positive first 
instance decisions, or 96% rate of recognition), followed 
by Eritreans (4,800, or 84%), Iraqis (4,700, or 87%) and 
Afghanis (2,500, or 70%).” See http://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statistics/explained/index.php/Asylum_quar
terly_report#Further_Eurostat_information. 
22 EASO (2015), “Asylum Applicants from Western 
Balkans: Comparative Analysis of Trends, Push-Pull 
Factors and Responses – Update” 
2.4 How much will it cost? 
The EU will play a very active role in covering its 
financial operability. The system will be 
supported by the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF), such that EU member 
states participating in the temporary relocation 
system will receive a lump sum of €6,000 for each 
beneficiary of international protection 
transferred from another member state. In 
addition, Greece and Italy will be paid a lump 
sum of at least €500 for each person to cover the 
transfer costs. 
In addition, EU member states “should be 
entitled to receive additional pre-financing to be 
paid in 2016 following the revision of their 
national programmes under the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund to implement 
actions under this Decision.” Article 10 states that 
“Member States shall, in 2016, be paid a pre-
financing amount of 50% of their total allocation 
pursuant to this Decision.”23 Annex 3 of this 
Policy Brief provides detailed information about 
EU financial support in the context of the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration and the 
Internal Security Funds. For the year 2015, Greece 
has received +/- €41.8 million (including €8.7 
million in emergency funding), and Italy +/- 
€58.3 million (including €19 million in emergency 
funding). 
(https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 
Asylum-Applicants-from-the-Western-Balkans_ 
Update_r.pdf). See also (https://easo.europa.eu/wp-
content/uploads/EASO-Report-Western-Balkans.pdf). 
23 According to the Commission Communication: 
“Under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF), Italy has, for 
example, received more than €19 million in emergency 
funding this year, Greece almost €5 million, with new 
requests now being processed. €4 million was allocated 
to Hungary last week, of a total of over €5 million so far 
this year. This is in addition to the large sums (over €300 
million) being released in 2015 as pre-financing under the 
multi-annual funds for migration and borders. Last 
week, Greece received a first tranche of €33 million and 
Italy received €39.2 million in August.” 
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2.5 How would the ‘emergency 
procedure’ work in practice?  
Each member state will formally appoint a 
national contact point, which shall be 
communicated to the other member states and 
EASO (Article 5 of the Decision). Other EU 
member states may appoint liaison officers in 
Greece and Italy. At least every three months, EU 
member states shall indicate the total number of 
applicants who can be relocated to their territory 
as well as their preferences.24 On the basis of this 
information, Italy and Greece, with the assistance 
of EASO, will identify those individuals who 
could be relocated, while giving priority to 
vulnerable applicants. 
The Decision foresees that Greece and Italy will 
need to take the decision “as soon as possible”, 
also in consultation with EASO, and they will 
need to notify the applicant accordingly.25 The 
relocation procedure should be completed within 
two months from the time the member state 
indicates its willingness to receive refugees. It 
could be extended two weeks more in those cases 
where “the approval by the Member State of 
relocation takes place less than two weeks before 
the expiry of that two-month period”. This time 
limit may also be extended for a four-week 
period “where Italy or Greece show objective 
practical obstacles that prevent the transfer from 
taking place”. If those time limits are not 
respected, Italy and Greece will be responsible 
for examining the asylum application.  
There is no provision for the preferences of the 
asylum-seekers to be taken into account. There 
                                                   
24 The Decision also grants the possibility to EU member 
states to indicate their preferences for applicants “in light 
of the principle of non-discrimination” and on the basis 
of which “on the basis of which Italy and Greece, in 
consultation with EASO and, where applicable, liaison 
officers, may compile lists of possible applicants 
identified for relocation to that Member State.” 
25 EU member states of relocation can refuse taking the 
applicant when “where there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding him or her as a danger to their national 
security or public order or where there are serious 
reasons for applying the exclusion provisions set out in 
Articles 12 and 17 of Directive 2011/95/EU”. Article 5.9 
states that “To ensure that the process remains efficient 
appears to be an assumption that the use of 
coercion is possible to force asylum-seekers to go 
to one destination rather than another without 
other considerations being taken on board. As 
the Commission has advised, the Dublin system 
of relocation does not work in practice with only 
3% of asylum-seekers every actually being 
subject to it. The reasons for this failure are 
multiple. The failure to engage asylum-seekers 
themselves in the decision on where they want to 
live and where there is capacity to receive them 
there remains central.  
The Decision only foresees a set of legal and 
procedural safeguards for those individuals 
relocated in Recital 35 and Article 6 of the 
Decision. These confer asylum-seekers the right 
to be informed about the relocation procedure 
“in a language which the applicant 
understands”. Once the relocation decision has 
been taken, Greece and Italy need to notify the 
decision in written the applicant as well as the 
Member state of relocation. EU member states 
shall ensure that family members who fall within 
the scope of this Decision are relocated to the 
territory of the same Member state, and take due 
account of the best interests of minors.26 
The temporary relocation system relies heavily 
on the obligation by the two countries concerned 
(Greece and Italy) to provide “structural 
solutions to address exceptional measures in 
their asylum and migration systems” and a 
“solid and strategic framework” for responding 
to the situation. And if that framework does not 
exist, the Commission has been entrusted to 
suspend the application of the Decision.27  
and manageable, reception facilities and measures shall 
be duly organised so as to temporarily accommodate 
people, in line with the Union acquis, until a decision is 
quickly taken on their situation.” 
26 Article 6.5 adds: “An applicant or beneficiary of 
international protection who enters the territory of a 
Member State other than the Member State of relocation 
without fulfilling the conditions for stay in that other 
Member State shall be required to return immediately. 
The Member State of relocation shall take back the person 
without delay.” 
27 It recalls Greece and Italy’s obligation to ensure “a 
robust mechanism of identification, registration and 
fingerprinting for the relocation procedure…so as to 
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2.6 The role of EU agencies in 
‘hotspots’  
The Decision envisages operational support to 
Italy and Greece in Article 7. It calls on EU 
member states to increase their support in the 
area of international protection through the 
activities coordinated by EU agencies like EASO 
and Frontex. This will take the form of EU 
member states providing national experts or 
support teams to work in so-called ‘hotspot 
areas’ and to participate or assist in: 
 The screening of those third-country 
nationals who arrive in Greece and Italy, 
which would include “their clear 
identification, fingerprinting and 
registration, and, where applicable, the 
registration of their application for 
international protection and, on request by 
Italy or Greece, their initial processing”; 
 The provision of information and assistance 
to applicants of international protection; and 
 The preparation and conduct of return 
operations. 
The model is developed in more detail in the 
Annex of the above-mentioned Commission 
Communication on Managing the Refugee 
Crisis,28 which foresees a system of migration 
management support teams in ‘hotspots’.29 The 
Commission envisages this support to take place 
through existing EU Home Affairs agencies 
under the control of the host state. These agencies 
                                                   
quickly identify the persons in need of international 
protection who are eligible for relocation and to identify 
the migrants who do not qualify for international 
protection and should therefore be returned”. 
Furthermore, the original Commission proposal stated in 
Article 8: “Hungary shall, on the date of entry into force 
of this Decision, present a roadmap to the Commission 
which shall include adequate measures in the area of 
asylum, first reception and return, enhancing the 
capacity, quality and efficiency of its systems in these 
areas as well as measures to ensure appropriate 
implementation of this Decision. Hungary shall fully 
implement this roadmap.” 
28 Annex 2 to the Commission Communication, 
Managing the refugees crisis: Immediate operational, 
budgetary and legal measures under the European 
Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final, 23.9.2015. 
will send “teams of experts directly to the 
'hotspots' in the host Member State” as deployed 
by other EU member states. The specific tasks of 
the experts deployed by the agencies are 
described as follows in the Communication: 
 Frontex: Screening experts and mobile 
offices to support in registering and 
fingerprinting migrants upon arrival; 
support in debriefing migrants to 
understand their routes to Europe and 
gathering information on the modus 
operandi of smugglers; providing pre-return 
assistance and coordinate return flights.  
 EASO: Support in the registration of asylum-
seekers and the preparation of the case file.  
 Europol and Eurojust: Support in the 
collection of information to dismantle 
smuggling networks. 
The operational support involves setting up in 
each member state a joint operational 
headquarters called the European Union 
Regional Task Force (EURTF), comprising 
representatives from the three agencies and 
coordinating the work on the ground as well as 
collaborating with national authorities. It also 
aims at facilitating the workability of the 
temporary relocation system envisaged by the 
Decision, in particular concerning the 
“identification, registration and fingerprinting of 
asylum applicants”. The Communication 
advances that “a joint operational headquarters 
has been set up in Catania (Sicily)30 to coordinate 
29 According to the Commission: “A 'hotspot' is an area 
at the external border that is confronted with 
disproportionate migratory pressure. Examples are 
Sicily and Lampedusa in Italy or Lesbos and Kos in 
Greece. It is in these 'hotspots' where most migrants enter 
the Union. It is here where the EU needs to provide 
operational support to ensure that arriving migrants are 
registered, and to avoid that they move on to other 
Member States in an uncontrolled way.” 
30According to the Communication: “Establishment of an 
EU Regional Task in Catania on 26 June 2015, composed 
of representatives of Frontex, EASO, Europol, 
EUNAVFORMED and national authorities to coordinate 
efforts of the Support Teams, ensuring coverage at 
different ports of disembarkation. Support of Eurojust to 
the Operational Frontex Regional Team in Catania and 
intensive cooperation with the correspondent of the 
National Anti-mafia and Anti-terrorism Directorate 
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the work in Italy, and a similar headquarters will 
be set up in Piraeus for the 'hotspots' in Greece.” 
EASO already plans that 45 experts will be 
deployed to Italy, and 28 to Greece. Frontex 
presence in Italy will be reinforced with the 
deployment of 18 debriefing experts, 16 cultural 
mediators and 12 screening experts, and in 
Greece with 33 experts (including Greek officials) 
and 7 mobile offices on the Aegean Islands 
(Samos, Lesvos, Chios, Kos, and Leros).31 A 
similar model may be applied in other EU 
member states facing similar challenges. The 
Communication emphasises that the Support 
Team does not operate reception centres and 
that: 
For the approach to be successful, the host 
Member State has to provide well-functioning 
reception facilities in which the expert teams 
deployed by the EU Agencies can operate. 
This includes first reception and pre-removal 
centres. The existence of sufficient reception 
facilities is also a necessary precondition for 
relocation, and the EU provides substantial 
financial support to Member States to build 
this infrastructure.32 (Emphasis added) 
This takes into account the criticism of reception 
conditions in Greece in particular and may be 
interpreted as a way to avoid EU responsibility 
for reception failures in Greece.33 Yet reception is 
at the heart of the system: as Human Rights 
Watch demonstrates in its report on Frontex’s 
assistance in border control in Greece after 2012, 
if the member state holds asylum-seekers in 
inhuman and degrading conditions akin to ill-
treatment or torture, an EU agency remains 
complicit in the continuation of that inhuman 
                                                   
(DNA) responsible for the district of Catania”, and 
“Setting up of first reception centres at four hotspots 
namely, Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle and Trapani in Sicily 
and the island of Lampedusa with a total capacity of 
approximately 1500. Two more first reception centres are 
planned for Augusta and Taranto by the end of the year.” 
31 In the case of Greece, it is stated in EASO (2015) that: 
“Greece has accepted that EASO supports it with the 
registration of applicants for international protection, the 
referral for outgoing Dublin ‘take charge’ requests and 
the provisional relocation measures. Greece has accepted 
an offer by Frontex to deploy 30 more screeners and de-
briefers.” 
and degrading system and therefore would be 
still legally responsible for the breach of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.34 
3. Moving beyond the Dublin logic? 
The building blocks of the EU relocation system 
are confronted with a number of problematic 
issues, which if not effectively addressed by 
European representatives will undermine its 
value added and efficacy from the very start of 
their implementation. Two in particular are in the 
dire need of correction, as discussed below. 
3.1 Weaknesses in the Dublin system  
The asylum relocation system proposed by the 
Commission is based on the assumption that the 
Dublin system can be saved by adding an 
‘emergency-led’ or crisis-focused regime for 
distributing asylum applicants between 
participating EU member states. Founding the 
application of new distribution criteria for 
sharing legal responsibility between member 
states under the Dublin system regulation is 
problematic. The quota plans still frame the 
protection of refugees as a border/burden-
sharing issue rather than as a collective EU-wide 
obligation.35 
International actors such as the Human Rights 
Commissioner of the Council of Europe and the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
human rights of migrants have called for a 
fundamental review of the Dublin Regulation 
32 That EASO report stipulates that in the case of Greece 
it is necessary to significantly strengthen “first reception 
capacity for new arrivals in mixed migratory movements 
on the Aegean islands, for which the Commission has 
just awarded €4.1 million” (Ibid., p. 3). 
33 www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/21/eus-dirty-
hands/frontex-involvement-ill-treatment-migrant-
detainees-greece  
34 www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/21/eus-dirty-
hands/frontex-involvement-ill-treatment-migrant-
detainees-greece  
35 Carrera & Lannoo, op. cit. 
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due to its inherent unfairness36 and the failure of 
the Dublin logic.37 The entire philosophy behind 
‘relocation’ is still based on the belief that the 
state of first entry should be solely responsible 
and structurally capable for assessing asylum 
applications and ensuring access to international 
protection the EU.  
The multitude of photos and videos showing the 
hardships experienced by asylum-seekers in 
countries like Greece or Hungary send a clear 
message that the system is not sustainable. The 
fact that no EU member states is sending back 
asylum-seekers to Greece due to systematic 
deficiencies in its asylum system further 
illustrates the unsustainability of this allocation 
of responsibility (the Dublin logic) model. 
Another shortcoming of the Dublin system has 
not been fully resolved by the relocation 
measures adopted and proposed so far. The EU 
relocation system foresees the application of 
alternative distribution criteria for determining 
state responsibility. These include, as outlined in 
section 2.2, population, total GDP, average 
number of asylum applications during the last 
five years and unemployment rates. As 
underlined elsewhere, however, these main 
indicators are mainly of a numerical or economic 
nature. Special care should be paid to ensure that 
these indicators do not obscure the protection 
needs of specific groups and take due account of 
the changing circumstances in countries of 
origin.38 
                                                   
36See “European can do more to protect refugees”, 
(http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-
/europe-can-do-more-to-protect-refugees? 
inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcom
missioner%2Fopinion-articles). 
37Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
of migrants, François Crépeau, “Banking on mobility 
over a generation: follow-up to the regional study on the 
management of the external borders of the European 
Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants”, 8 
May 2015 (www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/ 
SRMigrants/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx). One of his 
recommendations was for the EU to “take stock of the 
systemic failure of the Dublin mechanism. Reverse the 
present logic by allowing asylum-seekers to register their 
asylum claims in the country of their choice within the 
European Union, while supporting the countries 
The new relocation model also requires EU 
member states to take into consideration the so-
called ‘integration potential’ of asylum-seekers in 
other EU member states, which require national 
authorities to carry out an individual assessment 
considering the specific qualifications and 
characteristics of each applicant as well as 
his/her family linkages in specific EU member 
states.  
These criteria offer interesting possibilities for 
moving beyond the Dublin system, yet they don’t 
include the asylum-seeker’s preferences when 
determining the state of relocation and assessing 
those personal, family and economic 
circumstances. This oversight has been signalled 
as one of the most important weaknesses 
undermining the suitability of the Dublin system 
and calling for urgent EU policy reform.39 The 
European Parliament has agreed with the 
relocation proposals by the Commission.40 But it 
has also called for the new distribution system to 
include consideration of the asylum-seekers’ 
preferences as far as possible.  
The continuity of the Dublin logic positions the 
proposed model for ‘operational support’ in 
‘hotspots’ in a similarly difficult situation. If 
asylum-seekers refuse to register at the 
‘hotspots’, they will be most likely obliged to stay 
in that country without their personal 
circumstances and preferences being taken duly 
into consideration. As ECRE (European Council 
receiving asylum claims with proportionate and 
adequate financial and technical support.” 
38E. Guild et al. (2015), “The 2015 Refugee Crisis in the 
European Union”, CEPS Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels.  
39 E. Guild et al. (2015), “Enhancing the Common 
European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin”, 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, 
Brussels.  
40 See www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150915IPR93259/html/MEPs-give-go-
ahead-to-relocate-an-additional-120000-asylum-seekers-
in-the-EU and 
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20150903IPR91518/html/MEPs-
approve-first-emergency-rules-for-distributing-asylum-
seekers-in-the-EU. 
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on Refugees and Exiles) has argued,41 on the basis 
of a letter issued by the European Commissioner 
for Migration Avramopoulos to member state 
Interior Ministries,42 this may lead to more 
detention of asylum-seekers in the EU.  
The need for EU member states to take into 
account the applicants’ language skills and 
family, cultural or social ties when making the 
relocation decision will facilitate a more ‘person-
centric’ distribution asylum system in the Union. 
However, careful monitoring of its practical 
application should be carried out. Moreover, any 
permanent relocation system should take one 
step further and also include in these criteria the 
asylum-seekers’ preferences and circumstances. 
3.2 Flaws in the reception conditions  
A second outstanding challenge affecting the EU 
relocation system is the presumption or ‘trust’ 
that EU member states can in fact ensure sound 
and appropriate reception conditions and fulfil 
their human rights obligations vis-á-vis asylum-
seekers on the ground. 
Evidence provided by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
highlighted the main challenges that EU member 
states such as Greece face in their asylum 
systems. These relate to profound difficulties for 
asylum-seeker to obtain access to asylum 
procedures, a huge backlog of unresolved cases, 
                                                   
41 See http://ecre.org/component/content/article/ 
70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1114-eu-council-meeting-
reveals-a-lack-of-common-vision-amongst-member-
states-a-breakdown-of-trust-and-little-regard-for-the-
plight-of-refugees.html). 
42 See www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jun/eu-
AVRAMOPOULOS-migration-letter-to-eu-
ministers.pdf. The letter states: “The Hotspot approach, 
should enable frontline states to return irregular 
migrants swifter. Information on assisted voluntary 
return should be provided immediately and 
systematically upon arrival and at all stages of the 
identification and preparation of return. During and after 
the process of identification, to make sure that irregular 
migrants are effectively returned, detention should be 
applied, as a legitimate measure of last resort, where it is 
necessary to avoid that the irregular migrants abscond. 
For as long as there is a reasonable likelihood of removal, 
incidents of arbitrary detention, the lack of 
proper identification procedures and support for 
vulnerable individuals and appalling reception 
conditions.43 It its study of homeless refugees in 
Hungary, the UNHCR confirmed the poor 
reception conditions in the country and 
concluded that a key driver discouraging 
asylum-seekers from undertaking further 
onward movements in the EU mainly relate 
concerns over reception conditions and well-
being.44 Similar problems have also been 
identified in countries like Italy, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia.45 
The entire relocation and operational support 
system relies heavily on EU member states’ 
transposing effectively EU law and the strength 
of their national asylum process systems This has 
been illustrated in several cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.46 It has also been highlighted by the 
UNHCR which has stated that the new EU 
relocation plan “can only work if, at entry points 
in Europe, robust facilities are created to receive, 
assist, register and screen people. These facilities 
must have a capacity that could handle the 
current average 5,000 people arriving every day 
by boat."47 
A key incentive for people to stay in a particular 
country is that proper and humane reception 
conditions are fully ensured. This is clearly not 
the case across the EU. Annex 7 accompanying 
prospects of removal should not be undermined by 
premature ending of detention.” 
43 See UNHCR (2015). 
44 Ibid. The report states: “Refugees’ decision to engage 
in onward movements was reported to be primarily 
linked to survival concerns rather than being motivated 
by refugee aspirations for economic betterment or 
interest in more generous welfare provisions available in 
other EU Member States.” 
45 For Czech Republic see www.refworld.org/ 
pdfid/4f853c552.pdf), Italy (www.unhcr.org/ 
554a075a6.html) and Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia 
(www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45116#.
Vggwj8uqqkp). 
46 See the European Court of Human Rights Factsheet on 
‘Dublin Cases’ 
(www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Dublin_ENG.pdf).  
47 See UNHCR (2015). 
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the above-mentioned Commission 
Communication on Managing the Refugee Crisis 
COM(2013) 49048 provides a useful overview 
showing an astonishing failure by a large 
majority of EU member states in communicating 
to the Commission how they have implemented 
the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33 
and other pieces of legislation comprising the 
European asylum system. The resulting picture 
undermines the efficiency of the entire EU 
asylum system. 
4. Policy recommendations  
1. The EU should devise and develop a new 
European asylum system based on an 
innovative model of ‘institutional 
solidarity’ and operational support and 
taking the form of a Common EU Asylum 
Service.49 The Service would be competent 
to examine asylum applications and 
independently implement the new 
distribution key model of asylum-seekers. 
The feasibility, impact and specific features 
that would characterise the Service should 
be independently examined. 
2. The European Commission should pay 
close attention to more actively enforcing 
current EU legal standards on asylum, in 
particular the EU reception Directive and 
the human rights of asylum-seekers and 
refugees. The Commission should do more 
to build its own internal capacity to better 
ensure that all EU states comply with their 
obligations under EU law. Priority should 
be given to ensuring adequate reception, 
assistance, registration and screening 
capacity.50 This would constitute a key 
driver for asylum-seekers not to engage in 
onward movements in the EU. 
3. EU member countries should urgently 
boost their current and forward-looking 
capacity (of both their administrative and 
judicial systems) to deal with asylum 
applications, both in what concerns the 
speedy processing of asylum applications 
and avoiding arbitrary detention of 
applicants.51 
4. Any new and permanent EU distribution 
key system should complement the new 
distribution key criteria with an effective 
way for national authorities to assess the 
private and family links and vulnerabilities 
of the persons involved. As the European 
Parliament has recommended,52 this 
should also take into account as far as 
possible asylum-seekers’ personal 
preferences when determining the states 
responsible for examining their application 
for international protection. 
 
                                                   
48 Annex 7 of the Commission Communication on 
Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, 
budgetary and legal measures under the European 
Agenda on Migration’, COM(2013) 490, 23.9.2015. 
49 As proposed in S. Carrera, E. Guild and D. Gros (2015), 
“What priorities for the new European agenda on 
migration?”, CEPS Commentary; and S. Carrera and K. 
Lannoo (2015), “Treat the Root Causes of the Asylum 
Crisis, not the Symptoms”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels. 
50 As proposed by UNHCR (www.unhcr.org/ 
55f28c4c9.html). 
51As proposed by D. Gros (2015), Europe’s Double 
Refugee Crisis, CEPS Commentary, Brussels. 
52 European Parliament Resolution of 10 September 2015 
on migration and refugees in Europe (2015/2833(RSP)). 
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Annex 1 
Table 1. Allocations from Italy 
 
Source: Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and Greece, Council of the EU, 12098/15, 22 September 2015. 
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Table 2. Distribution key for Italy 
 
Source: European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary, COM(2015) 451 final, 9.9.2015. 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm). 
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Table 3. Allocations from Greece 
 
Source: Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the 
benefit of Italy and Greece, Council of the EU, 12098/15, 22 September 2015. 
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Table 4. Distribution key for Greece 
 
Source: European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and 
Hungary, COM(2015) 451 final, 9.9.2015. (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5596_en.htm). 
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Annex 2. The economic formula devised by the Commission for a refugee distribution key 
 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_ep_and_council_establishing_a_crisis_relocation_mechanism_-_annex_en.pdf 
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Annex 3. Financial Support under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund 
 Long-term Funding 2014-2020 First Payments in 2015 of Long-term Funding Emergency Funding 
  AMIF Allocation ISF-Borders Allocation 
 ISF-Police 
Allocation 
 TOTAL AMIF + 
ISF Allocations 
First AMIF pre-
financing payment 
(Green/Bold = 
Paid) 
First ISF pre-
financing payment  
(Green/Bold = 
Paid) 
AMIF 
emergency 
assistance 
received and 
requested  
ISF Borders 
emergency 
assistance 
received and 
requested  
Austria €64,533,977 €14,162,727 €12,162,906€ €90,859,610 €4,937,378.39 €1,858,229.31 €5,030,000  
Belgium €89,250,977 €17,519,321 €17,903,270 €124,673,568 €6,878,531.95 €2,745,441.37   
Bulgaria €10,006,777 €40,366,130 €32,002,293 €82,375,200 €700,474.39 €5,093,194.61 €4,150,000  
Croatia €32,308,677 €34,507,030 €8,117,257 €74,932,964 €1,199,366.00 €3,829,363.79   
Cyprus €17,133,800 €35,609,771 €19,095,426 €71,838,997 €2,261,607.39 €2,983,700.09 €940,000  
Czech 
Republic €26,185,177 €14,381,484 €17,029,012 €57,595,673 €1,937,962.39 €2,252,914.72   
Denmark  €10,322,133  €10,322,133  €722,549.31   
Estonia €10,156,577 €21,781,752 €13,480,269 €45,418,598 €406,263.08 €2,468,341.47   
Finland €23,488,777 €36,934,528 €15,682,348 €76,105,653 €3,089,714.39 €3,708,381.32   
France €265,565,577 €84,999,342 €70,114,640 €420,679,559 €20,061,340.39 €12,401,478.74 €8,980,000  
Germany €208,416,877 €51,753,437 €79,504,401 €339,674,715 €15,499,181.39 €9,411,698.66 
€7,030,000  
Further 
requests 
pending 
 
Greece €259,348,877 €166,814,388 €20,489,650 €446,652,915 €18,154,421.39 €15,039,082.66 
€1,180,000  
Further 
requests 
pending 
€7,500,000 
Hungary €23,713,477 €40,829,197 €20,663,922 €85,206,596 €1,687,943.39 €4,304,518.33 €5,210,000 €1,490,000 
Ireland €19,519,077  €9,243,080 €28,762,157 €1,587,535.39 €647,015.60   
Italy €310,355,777 €156,306,897 €56,631,761 €523,294,435 €22,074,904.39 €17,142,206.06 €13,660,000 €5,460,000 
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 Long-term Funding 2014-2020 First Payments in 2015 of Long-term Funding Emergency Funding 
  AMIF Allocation ISF-Borders Allocation 
 ISF-Police 
Allocation 
 TOTAL AMIF + 
ISF Allocations 
First AMIF pre-
financing payment 
(Green/Bold = 
Paid) 
First ISF pre-
financing payment  
(Green/Bold = 
Paid) 
AMIF 
emergency 
assistance 
received and 
requested  
ISF Borders 
emergency 
assistance 
received and 
requested  
Latvia €13,751,777 €15,521,704 €16,941,431 €46,214,912 €962,624.39 €2,303,919.45   
Lithuania €9,632,277 €178.704.873 €16,120,656 €204,457,806 €674,259.39 €13,716,537.03   
Luxembourg €7,160,577 €5,400,129 € €2,102,689 € €14,663,395 €557,240.39 €525,197.26   
Malta €17,178,877 €53,098,597 € €8,979,107 € €79,256,581 €1,202,521.39 €5,227,439.28   
Netherlands €94,419,077 €30,609,543 € €31,540,510 € €156,569,130 €8,940,685.39 €4,596,203.71 €2,150,000  
Poland €63,410,477 €49,113,133 € €39,294,220 € €151,817,830 €4,857,553.48 €6,188,514.71   
Portugal €32,776,377 €18,900,023 € €18,693,124 € €70,369,524 €2,369,946.39 €2,705,442.04   
Romania €21,915,877 €61,151,568 € €37,150,105 € €120,217,550 €1,710,161.39 €6,893,717.11   
Slovakia €10,980,477 €10,092,525 € €13,891,478 € €34,964,480 €915,353.39 €1,678,880.21   
Slovenia €14,725,477 €30,669,103 € €9,882,037 € €55,276,617 €1,030,783.39 €2,883,032.60   
Spain €257,101,877 €195,366,875 € €54,227,207 € €506,695,959 €18,179,131.39 €18,348,545.74   
Sweden €118,536,877 €11,518,706 €21,057,201 € €151,112,784 €10,790,281.39 €2,280,313.49   
United 
Kingdom €370,425,577 N/A N/A €370,425,577 €27,483,790.39 N/A   
TOTAL €2,392,000,002 €1,207,730,043 €662,000,000 €4,440,434,918 €180,150,956.48 €151,955,858.67 €48,330,000 €14,450,000.00 
 
Source: European Commission, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Managing the Refugees Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 
451, 23.9.2015. 
 
